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ABSTRACT This article revisits Parsons’ insights on medicine, health and
illness in the light of contemporary debates in medical sociology and beyond.
A preliminary balance sheet of the Parsonian legacy is first provided, taking
on board standard accounts and criticisms of Parsons’ work within medical
sociology to date. The remainder of the article, in contrast, involves a close
re-reading of Parsons in the light of contemporary sociological debates on
the body, emotion, trust, uncertainty and health, including late modern and
postmodern interpretations of his work. Parsons, it is concluded, despite his
(many) critics and detractors, has much to contribute here, not simply in terms
of past insights, but also with regard to the present and future.
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Introduction
It is, by now, a well-rehearsed argument that Parsons is a key figure, if not
a ‘founding father’, as far as the origin and development of medical soci-
ology is concerned. Parsons’ analysis of illness as social deviance, and the
sick role as a socially prescribed mechanism for channelling and controlling
this deviance, is a key point of reference in the history of medical sociology,
and a staple part of the diet that students of medical sociology (or sociology
of health and illness as it is now more commonly known)1 are fed, year in
year out, on both sides of the Atlantic. So extensive have these discussions
of Parsons been, and so familiar the lines of criticism advanced, that we
may justifiably feel fed up or sick of the sick role, believing that we are now
(thankfully) much further forward in these debates, as the sociology of
health and illness finds its feet, and the pace of social change increases.
Is Parsons, then, a relic of the dim and distant past, as far as current
agendas in the sociology of health and illness are concerned? Is there, in
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other words, any merit in revisiting, once again, these Parsonian insights in
the light of contemporary debates in the sociology of health and illness and
beyond? Can we bear it? There is, I believe, in answer to these questions,
much to be had from a return to, revisiting or revival of interest in Parsons’
insights in this domain, not least in terms of contemporary debates within
the sociology of health and illness and beyond. Herein lies the rationale for
this article, which returns to and re-reads Parsons in and through the follow-
ing contemporary sociological themes and issues: the body, emotions, trust,
uncertainty and health. Doing so, I venture, provides the means for a profit-
able and productive dialogue or interchange between past and present
sociological concerns and insights that in turn flags future potential agendas.
Before doing so, however, a brief reprisal or preliminary balance sheet
of the main lines of debate concerning Parsons’ contribution to medical
sociology if not the sociology of health and illness may prove useful as a
backdrop to the themes and issues that follow. What, that is to say, accord-
ing to standard accounts and conventional wisdom, are we to make of the
Parsonian legacy for medical sociology?
The Parsonian legacy: a preliminary balance sheet
The usual line or gloss on Parsons, taking Chapter X of The social system
(Parsons, 1951) as its point of reference, runs something like this. Parsons,
in keeping with his structural-functionalist principles, viewed health as a
functional prerequisite of society. From the point of view of the social
system, too low a level of health and too high an incidence of illness is
dysfunctional. Illness, in other words, given its interference with normal role
capacity, becomes a form of social deviance that needs channelling there-
fore in an appropriate fashion through an institutionalized role or niche.
The sick role, for Parsons, fulfils precisely these goals through a series
of rights and obligations that its incumbents must recognize and respect.
On the rights side of the equation, the patient (according to the severity of
the illness) is exempt from normal role obligations, and is not deemed
responsible for falling ill. On the obligations side of the equation, the
patient must seek technically competent help and must want to get well.
The doctor, for his part (Parsons, a product of his times, always refers to
men),2 must apply these technically competent skills in order to facilitate
(a swift) recovery, guided as he is by the professional constellation of
achievement, universalism, functional specificity, affective neutrality and
collectivity-orientation (i.e. Parsons’ (in)famous pattern variable schema).3
The sick role, therefore, serves to discourage the secondary gains of
illness and prevent what Parsons, rightly or wrongly, sees as a deviant sub-
culture of sickness from forming through this reciprocal cluster of rights
and obligations, the aim of which is to reintegrate the individual back into
society through a return to normal role capacity (or an approximation
thereof) as quickly as possible.4
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The merits of this Parsonian analysis, as noted in the introduction, have
been much debated over the years, both theoretically and empirically. The
main lines of criticism, in this respect, concern Parsons’ consensual
(medico-centric) approach to these matters; his formulation of what in effect
is a patient role which neglects the illness iceberg; the limited applicability
of the sick role to chronic illness and other conditions such as pregnancy;
and his failure to address factors such as class, gender, age and ethnicity in
medical encounters. We may also question whether illness is deviance, given
(1) the extent of illness in the community and (2) the fact that sick role
incumbency involves conformity rather than deviance (Pflanz and Rhode,
1970) – for classic sociological critiques and extensions to the Parsonian
sick role see, for example, Gallagher (1976) and Freidson (1970); see also
Freund et al. (2003) for a more recent critique. These, to be sure, are import-
ant points to raise and cannot be dismissed lightly. Nor is it my intention to
do so. In response to his critics, none the less, Parsons (1975) claimed that:
(1) he had never meant to confine the category of illness to deviant behav-
iour, though its negative valuations should nevertheless be borne in mind;
(2) his concerns were not exclusive to cases of acute illness as opposed to
chronic illness; and (3) although interaction between doctor and patient is
a two-way not one-way process, it is still basically asymmetrical because of
the physician’s expertise and the special fiduciary responsibility this entails
for the care of the sick (of which more later).
Abiding themes/contemporary insights:
connecting past and present
Whether or not Parsons was successful here in revisiting or defending the
sick role is, of course, a moot point. The above criticisms, to repeat, cannot
be dispensed or done away with easily. There is none the less, I contend,
much to be gained from a close re-reading of Parsons in the light of contem-
porary themes and debates within and beyond the sociology of health and
illness. Five key themes and issues, in particular, themselves far from
exclusive or exhaustive, merit further discussion in this context.
The (sick/mortal) body: the sacred and the profane
There has, to be sure, been an explosion of interest in the body in recent
years debates, which seem to take us far beyond anything remotely Parson-
ian (Turner, 1984; Shilling, 1993; Nettleton and Watson, 1998; Williams and
Bendelow, 1998; Williams, 2003). This may well be true, but there are also
rich Parsonian themes to mine here, as contribution to these more recent
debates.
Perhaps the first thing to say in this respect, given the dominance of social
constructionist perspectives (on the body and disease), is that Parsons,
unlike many (medical) sociologists, not only had a long-standing interest
in biology, but a preliminary training in medicine; credentials which,
Williams: Parsons Revisited
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without over-stretching the case, imbued his analysis with a certain realist
tone or quality as far as the ontological vulnerability of corporeal bodies
and the potential for human suffering are concerned. Illness, in other words,
is not solely or simply a social state of affairs, however important these
social factors might be.5 As Parsons puts it, in his own inimitable fashion:
Illness is a state of disturbance in the ‘normal’ functioning of the total human
individual, including both the states of the organism as a biological system and of
his personal and social adjustments. It is thus partly biological and partly socially
defined. Participation in the social system is always potentially relevant to the
state of illness, to its etiology and to the conditions of successful therapy, as well
as other things. (1951: 431, emphases added)
Illnesses, Parsons stresses, range from the ‘purely somatic’ to the ‘purely
mental’, both of which are ‘limiting concepts’ with the prominence of the
factors of ‘relativity’ due to ‘culture and social structure’ increasing as one
progresses along this continuum (1964: 258). The importance of the ‘inter-
penetration’ between somatic and mental aspects is ‘so great’, however,
that it would be ‘a mistake’, in Parsons’ view, to ‘draw any rigid line, in any
empirical terms, between them’ (1964: 258). Issues of urgency and severity,
of course, complicate the picture further here, but Parsons is clear that pain,
suffering and the risk of death, or serious, lengthy or permanent disable-
ment, singly or in combination, are common features of what it is to be
sick, thereby suggesting if not demanding the need for technically compe-
tent help. ‘Feelings of helplessness’ and the ‘need for help’, that is to say,
are ‘very real’ (1951: 440). The dilemmas of the sick, in short, given the
(ontological) contingencies and vulnerabilities of both psyche and soma,
bring person qua patient and expert qua doctor into an existentially charged
situation that requires careful management on both sides.
Matters do not end here, however, as far as Parsons’ treatment of the
body is concerned. The physician deals with ‘human beings’, he declares,
and does so in situations which often involve ‘intimacies’ and which are often
‘peculiarly “private” to the individual, or to especially intimate relations with
others’ (1951: 451). The ‘integrity of the individual’ and the ‘“inviolability”
of the body’, therefore, weigh heavily in the balance sheet as far a medical
practice is concerned. The amounts and occasions of bodily exposure and
contact, indeed, are ‘carefully regulated in all societies, especially ours’. To
see a person naked, in this context, where this is not usual, is a ‘privilege’
which calls for explanation in view of these factors, particularly when
exposure and contact involves a patient of the opposite sex – although
physical contact between men, and between women, is also closely regu-
lated. Both the ‘parts of the body themselves’ and ‘acts of exposure and of
bodily contact’, from this Parsonian viewpoint, are ‘expressive symbols of
highly strategic significance’, in or out of the doctor’s surgery (1951: 451).
Along with this goes the related problem of sentiments towards injury
of the body, which include issues such as anxiety about the insertion of
health: 9(2)
126
01 Williams (bc/t)  25/2/05  2:59 pm  Page 126
needles, and the problem of seeking consent to surgical procedures and
many types of diagnostic tests: none of which, Parsons insists, can be taken
for granted (1951: 452). Similar considerations apply to the physician’s need
of access to confidential information about the patient’s private life.
Successful control, in this respect, given the ‘potentialities of disturbance’,
presents ‘peculiarly important sociological problems’ (1951: 452, emphasis
in original).
To these Parsonian dilemmas of living bodies, we may add his insights
into the medical rites and rituals associated with dead bodies. It is striking,
Parsons notes, that medicine is one of the few occupational groups which
in our society have ‘regular, expected contact with death in the course of
their occupational roles’; the clergyman, the undertaker and in certain ways
the police being the other principal ones (1951: 444). This association with
death, Parsons ventures, is a very important factor, not simply in the
‘emotional toning’ of the role of the physician, but also in terms of issues
to do with the sacred. The dissection of a cadaver in medical training, for
example, is something of a ‘solemn ritual’ or rite of passage, which medical
students often have quite violent emotional reactions to, especially the first
day. It may therefore be concluded that:
dissection is not only an instrumental means to learning anatomy, but is a
symbolic act, highly charged with affective significance. It is in a sense the initia-
tory rite of the physician-to-be into his intimate associations with death and the
dead. (1951: 445)
Whether, of course, the advent of ‘virtual dissection’ and ‘cyber-anatomy’,
realized through on-line developments such as the virtual human project
(Waldby, 2000), radically changes these associations, reactions and relations
is a moot point. Confrontations with the mortal body, if not the cadaver,
none the less, are an inescapable part of medical practice, both as neophyte
medical students and fully fledged physicians.
As for broader questions of death in the western world, particularly the
frequent allegation of ‘death denial’, Parsons’ answer is unequivocal:
death, or the limited temporal duration of the individual life course, must be
regarded as one of the facts of life that is as inexorable as the need to eat and
breathe in order to live. In this sense, death is completely normal, to the point
that its ‘denial’ must be regarded as pathological. Moreover, this normality
includes the consideration that, from an evolutionary point of view . . . death
must be regarded as having high survival value, organically at least to the species,
actionwise to the future of the sociocultural system. These scientific consider-
ations are not trivial, or conventional, or culture-bound but are fundamental.
(1978a: 346, emphasis in original)
This, however, he hastens to add, in keeping with the foregoing analysis,
should not be taken to imply that death is now met with calmness or equa-
nimity. On the contrary, anxiety about death, both that of others and that
of one’s own, is still very much in evidence, even if death itself is not denied
Williams: Parsons Revisited
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or disavowed. In certain circumstances, indeed, Parsons ventures, ‘the level
of anxiety may be expected to increase rather than the reverse’ (1978a: 349).
Parsons’ approach to the (sick/mortal) body, then, as this brief sketch
suggests, is rich and multifarious, including the existential predicaments and
dysfunctional consequences of sickness, the expressive symbolism and
strategic significance of bodily exposure and contact and related issues of
intimacy and taboo, life and death, if not the sacred and the profane. The
Parsonian patient, we might say, dead or alive, is far from disembodied.
This in turn paves the way for a related set of musings concerning
Parsons’ insights into the emotional and psychodynamic elements of the
medical encounter: issues, as we shall see, which throw the limits of
consumer reflexivity and associated rhetoric concerning contemporary
health care into critical relief.
Emotion, reflexivity and the unconscious:
the return of the repressed?
As with the body, sociological attention to the emotional dimensions and
dynamics of social life has mushroomed in recent years (James and Gabe,
1996; Bendelow and Williams, 1998; Williams, 2001). Again, without wishing
to push the case too far, Parsons’ insights foreshadow much of this current
debate, particularly as far as the nature and dynamics of the medical
encounter, both past and present, is concerned.
The situation of illness, Parsons notes, building on the foregoing (bodily)
insights, presents the patient and those close to him with complex problems
of ‘emotional adjustment’. This is, to put it bluntly, a situation of ‘consider-
able strain’. Even if there is no question of a ‘psychic’ factor in the condition
in question:
Suffering, helplessness, disablement and risk of death, or sometimes its certainty,
constitute fundamental disturbances of the expectations by which [we] live. They
cannot in general be emotionally ‘accepted’ without the accompaniments of
strain with which we are familiar and hence without difficult adjustments unless
the patient happens to find positive satisfactions in them, in which case there is
also a social problem. The significance of this emotional factor is magnified and
complicated in so far as defensive adjustive mechanisms are deeply involved in
the pathological condition itself. (Parsons, 1951: 443)
More specifically, Parsons stresses, two types of reaction on the part of the
patient may be prominent here: first a kind of emotional ‘shock’ at the
beginning of illness, and second ‘anxiety’ about the future. The tendency
to over-estimate the chances of a quick and complete recovery is also noted
by Parsons, thus making even the necessary degree of emotional accept-
ance of the reality of the situation difficult. Alternatively, ‘exaggerated self-
pity’ and ‘whining’ may occur, which itself, we might comment, has as much
to do with the social setting the patient finds themselves in as it does with
the particular emotional characteristics and dispositions of the patient in
health: 9(2)
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question. What physicians do, moreover, ‘inevitably influences the emotional
states of the patient, and often this may have a most important influence
on the state of their cases’ (1951: 443).
All in all, then, without even considering the emotional stresses and
strains of the physician’s role, this amounts to a highly charged, or poten-
tially highly charged, situation, which in Parsons’ terms, makes a high level
of ‘rationality of judgement peculiarly difficult’ for the patient; or to put it
another way, leaves the patient ‘open to, and peculiarly liable to, a whole
series of ir- and non-rational beliefs and practices’ (1951: 446).
We may well wish to take issue with Parsons here, not simply in terms
of his characterization of the ‘irrational’ patient, but in terms of his prob-
lematic equation of emotion with these ir- or non-rational dimensions of
life; a common problem, in fact, not simply confined to Parsons (Williams,
2001).6 The basic fact holds, none the less, that the emotional dimensions
of illness in general and the sick role in particular, are of no small import-
ance or significance in medical practice and should not therefore be
neglected.
Parsons, however, pushes these insights much further through his own
interest and training in psychoanalysis. Perhaps the key issue here for our
purposes, concerns the fact that the physician tends to acquire, through
processes of a largely unconscious nature, various types of ‘projective
significance which may not be directly relevant to his specifically technical
function’ (1951: 453). These issues, in psychoanalytic parlance, are related
to the ‘transference’ phenomenon, which derives from the psychological
needs of the patient, who invests the physician with ‘inappropriate’ and
unrealistic significance, not infrequently related to a reactivation of parental
roles in childhood. Transference, Parsons states, is most conspicuously
encountered in ‘psychiatric cases’, but there is ‘every reason to believe that
it is always a factor in the doctor/patient relationship, the more so the longer
their duration and the greater the emotional importance of the health
problem and hence the relation to the physician’ (1951: 453). Taken
together, these issues, in conjunction with the physician’s own handling of
the counter-transference phenomenon, present a ‘very considerable set of
complications’ to the functioning of medical practice on the level of human
adjustment: issues which the specific duties and obligation of these recip-
rocal role structures are designed to meet and overcome, both latently and
manifestly.
In particular, the professional constellation of achievement, universalism,
functional specificity, affective neutrality and collectivity-orientation,
mentioned earlier, functions to ensure that a specific series of mechanisms
are in place to meet these strains and overcome the obstacles to the
‘effective practice of scientific medicine’. Not only does this enable the
physician to ‘penetrate’ sufficiently into the private affairs of the patient,
it effectively protects the former from being drawn into the transference
relation: ‘whether it is love or hate the patient projects upon him, he fails
Williams: Parsons Revisited
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to reciprocate in the expected terms. He remains objective and affectively
neutral’ (Parsons, 1951: 460–1).
This discrepancy between the transference reaction and the realistic role
of the physician provides a crucial point of therapeutic leverage, not simply
in psychotherapeutic settings, but in medical contexts more generally,
whether one is aware of it or not. Psychotherapy to the ‘militantly anti-
psychiatric organic’ physician, Parsons states:
is like theory to the anti-theoretical empirical scientist. In both cases he practices
it whether he knows it or wants to or not. He may well indeed do it very effec-
tively just as one can use language without even knowing it has a grammatical
structure. But the general conclusion is that a very important part of non- and
pre-psychiatric medical practice is in fact ‘unconscious psychotherapy’ and this
could not be true if the institutional structure of the physician’s role were not
approximately what it has here been shown to be. (1951: 462, emphases added)
From this, returning to and elaborating upon the preliminary sketch of
Parsons at the outset of this article, flows the following general conclusion.
The sick role and physician role serve as mechanisms of ‘social control’
through the ‘channelling’ of deviance, in this case illness, thereby avoiding
other (debatably) ‘dangerous’ possibilities, such as group formation (i.e. a
‘deviant sub-culture’ of the sick). The sick role, in other words, provides both
an ‘insulating’ and ‘reintegrative’ function, the significance of which, as we
have seen, is greatly enhanced through the conscious and unconscious
processes of psychotherapy which, in a general sense, may be subsumed under
the rubric of the ‘art of medicine’. All good medicine, to repeat, involves
some degree of psychotherapy. Deliberate psychotherapy, however, is:
only the tip of the iceberg which extends above the water. The considerably larger
part is below the surface of the water. Even its existence has been largely unknown
to most psychiatrists, to say nothing of laymen. It consists in certain institutional
features of the physician’s role in its particular form of meshing with the sick
role. (Parsons, 1951: 478, emphases added)
The sick role, in short, is part and parcel of a much larger set of mechan-
isms embedded in the social system: a ‘window’, effectively, on a broader
set of motivational balances, of which illness is part, extending far beyond
the doctor’s surgery.
Gerhardt (1979, 1987, 1989) sheds further important light on these issues,
delineating what she takes to be two models of illness in the Parsonian
paradigm. The ‘incapacity model’, as she terms it, focuses on illness as a
breakdown of role capacity, the aetiology of which are role-related strains
due to competitive occupational and other roles, with therapy viewed in
terms of the exemptions and duties of the sick role. The ‘deviancy model’,
on the other hand, views illness as motivated deviance from the norm to
conform with role expectations, the aetiology of which is related to repressed
dependency needs which acts as unconscious motivation to becoming ill
(through greater exposure to risks, for example, of accident, injury or
health: 9(2)
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infection), with therapy conceived as a four-stage process of social control.
‘Unconscious psychotherapy’, within this latter model, moves from permis-
siveness to support, to denial of reciprocity (selective rewarding), to manipu-
lation of rewards (reinforcement); a process in which unleashed dependency
needs are re-repressed and superego controls restored en route to recovery
(Gerhardt, 1979: 238). These two models therefore may be characterized
as structural and psychodynamic explanations of illness respectively. They
may be reconciled, Gerhardt suggests, by virtue of the fact that they focus
on ‘different stages of the illness process, and may be seen as complemen-
tary rather than alternative’ (1979: 238). For Gerhardt, moreover, return-
ing to the criticisms of Parsons at the beginning of this article, there has
been a tendency to mistake the structural incapacity model for Parsons’
deviance model of illness, thereby over-simplifying the paradigm and result-
ing in much misplaced criticism – see also Gerhardt (1987, 1989).
These emotional and psychodynamic issues, it is clear, are as relevant
today as ever they were, not simply as far as developments in areas such
as general practice are concerned – where patient subjectivity and the role
of the doctor as ‘friend, guide and counsellor’ is increasingly stressed (see
Armstrong, 1983, 1984; Gothill and Armstrong, 1999) – but also in terms
of what they have to say about the limits of consumer reflexivity in health
care. The underlying assumption of much consumerist rhetoric in health
care, for example, as Lupton points out, is of a rational reflexive agent, or
a dispassionate calculating subject, who is encouraged to: (1) resist paternal-
ism or medical dominance; (2) actively evaluate health care sciences; (3)
voice complaints through appropriate channels; and (4) ‘shop around’
(potentially at least) should the ‘commodity’ which health care is fast
becoming not prove up to scratch (1997a: 373–4) – see also Henderson and
Petersen (2002) for an exploration of the diverse meanings and manifes-
tations of consumerism in health care.
Yet as Lupton found in her own empirical study, in a manner that echoes
and amplifies these Parsonian insights, this privileged representation of the
patient simply fails to recognize:
the often unconscious, unarticulated dependence that patients may have on doctors.
This representation also tends to take up the mind/body separation in its valoriz-
ing of rational thought over affective and embodied response. It is as if ‘the
consumer’ lacks the physically vulnerable, desiring, all-too-human body which
is the primary object of medical care. (1997a: 380, emphasis added)
Herein lies the paradox that, far from assuaging anxiety, the imperatives of
consumerism in health care may actually exacerbate it. Instead of alleviat-
ing the vulnerability and anxiety accompanying such dependence, that is
to say, ‘the continuing emphasis upon autonomy, individualism and distrust
in consumerist discourse may only serve to generate further uncertainty
and vulnerability’ (Lupton, 1996: 170). Lay people, in short, may pursue
both the ideal-type ‘consumerist’ and ‘passive patient’ subject positions
Williams: Parsons Revisited
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simultaneously or variously depending on the context in question. Either
way, a one-sided emphasis on consumerism fails to account for the complex-
ity of medical encounters and the changeable/chargeable nature of desires,
emotions and needs contained therein (Lupton, 1997a).
As for broader questions concerning the merits or relevance of a psycho-
analytically informed (medical) sociology, this itself has been the subject
of recent (heated) discussion and debate. On the one hand, writers such as
Figlio (1987) and Lupton (1997a), call for a medical sociology or sociology
of health and illness which incorporates understandings of subjectivity
derived from psychoanalytic writings, with particular reference to the
medical consultation and illness experience. A sensitive and sympathetic
return to Parsons – alongside other writers on the psychodynamics of the
medical encounter such as Stein (1985) – is indeed appropriate on this
count. Lupton (1997b) goes further in fact, arguing not only that
Foucauldian thought reprises in many ways some of the themes of Parson-
ian thought (given a similar interest in the voluntary taking up of societal
imperatives), but that there is much value in bringing together Foucauldian
and theoretical psychoanalytical perspectives on subjectivity in ways that
go beyond the therapeutic emphasis on the use of psychoanalysis in favour
of a more critical approach. The contradictory nature of desires and impera-
tives, she rightly argues, is integral to the understanding of humans as social
beings. It is important for current debates on the potential of human agency
and resistance, therefore, including those arising from Foucauldian critiques,
to recognize this:
contradiction and ambivalence at the heart of subjectivity and the potentially
disruptive nature of desire and the unconscious. The psychoanalytic perspective
goes some way to providing a theoretical basis for the emergence of resistance
to social norms and expectations. Individuals are viewed as actively participating
in their own domination as well as resisting it, disrupting as well as conforming
to convention because of emotional investments, desires and phantasies that they
themselves may be unable fully to articulate. (Lupton, 1997b: 576, emphasis added)
Without some degree of understanding of the psychoanalytic processes
involved, Lupton contends, sociologists of health and medicine will be
‘unable fully to analyse the continuing complexities of the doctor/patient
relationship, the medical encounter and the illness experience’ (1997b: 577).
Psychoanalysis, moreover, not only provides potentially valuable insights
into (Kleinian) processes such as projection, introjection and splitting (of
the ‘good’/‘bad’ variety)7 by doctors and patients alike, it can also be turned
on the sociological imagination itself in more or less fruitful or ‘playful’
ways (see Craib, 1988, 1995, 1997).
Caution is needed here, however, suggesting perhaps the need for a
somewhat more tempered response to the sociological merits of psycho-
analysis. Pilgrim (1998), for example, raises a number of important points
here in his rejoinder to Lupton (1997b). Psychoanalysis, he notes, has
health: 9(2)
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indeed had a ‘fair airing’ within social science, rather than sociology per se,
throughout the 20th century. What is needed, therefore, is for psycho-
analysis to be ‘appraised not praised’. While the illuminating contribution
of groups such as the Frankfurt school is important to acknowledge, the
‘problems of psychoanalysis-as-social-science should also be critically esti-
mated’ (1998: 542). Of particular note in this respect is its ‘doctor-centred
authoritarianism’ – psychoanalysis itself is a version of medical work – its
imperialistic stance towards subjectivity, its lack of internal coherence and
its tendency towards psychological reductionism; all of which, Pilgrim
suggests, make it a ‘rather dubious starting point for medical sociologists’
(1998: 542). Viewed in these terms, alleged sociological neglect or ignor-
ance of psychoanalytic matters (since Parsons’ time) may not simply be well
founded but a carefully considered stance.
What this boils down to then, in part at least, is a struggle between those
advocates of a ‘psychoanalytic sociology’ and those, like Pilgrim, who
instead favour a ‘sociology of psychoanalysis’ and a defence of the irre-
ducible social and material dimensions of life. There may, however, be
something of a middle ground here, which characterizations of this kind
tend to gloss or miss. Sociologists, to be sure, should rightly be cautious or
wary of too readily and uncritically endorsing or incorporating psycho-
analytic ideas into their work, but this far from precludes or rules out the
importance of psychoanalytic ideas and understandings within sociology.
Lupton none the less, like others before her, is surely right to remind us of
the importance of more critical approaches or rapprochements which
recognize the complexities and contradictions, ambiguities and ambiva-
lences of us all qua patients, people and social beings. There are, in short,
limits to sociology, just as there are limits to psychoanalysis (see Craib,
1988) which itself, surely, demands or necessities an ongoing dialogue and
debate, if not a rapprochement of sorts.
Authority, trust and expertise: old wine, new bottles?
It is at this very point that certain other key features of Parsons’ account,
already touched on or alluded to earlier, come to the fore; issues, that is to
say, to do with authority, trust and expertise. We may very well, returning
to some of the standard criticisms levelled at Parsons, question the consen-
sual and functionalist assumptions upon which his portrayal of the
doctor–patient relationship rests, particularly in the current era where more
‘negotiative’ if not ‘conflictual’ relationships are said to exist. The ‘doc as
daddy’ bias is also, to repeat, inappropriate or wide of the mark.
Again, however, I venture, Parsons’ underlying assumption and defence
of the basically asymmetrical nature of the medical encounter, and the auth-
ority, trust and expertise upon which it rests, cannot be dismissed or
discounted lightly. While acknowledging that interaction between physician
and patient is two-way not one-way, Parsons (1975) indeed, as noted earlier,
insists that the relationship is basically asymmetrical due to the physicians’
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legitimate authority and expertise in matters of health and illness, gained
through prolonged training and experience, and expressed through the
special fiduciary responsibility for the care of the sick; an orientation, to
repeat, based on achievement values, universalism, functional specificity,
affective neutrality and collectivity-orientation, thereby contrasting sharply
with competitive commercial relationships.
This in turn may be interpreted to mean that the relationship is expected
to be one of ‘“ mutual trust”, of the belief that the physician is trying his
best to help the patient and conversely that the patient is “cooperating”
with him to the best of his ability’ (Parsons, 1951: 464). In a very special
and informal sense then, Parsons argues, the doctor–patient relationship
‘has to be one involving an element of authority’, but one which is not
legitimized without reciprocal collectivity-orientation in the relationship.
To the ‘doctor’s obligation to use his authority “responsibly” in the interest
of the patient’, in other words, corresponds the ‘patient’s obligation faith-
fully to accept the implication of the fact he is “Dr X’s patient” and so
long as this remains the case must “do his part” in the common enterprise’
(1951: 465).
Two further points are worth stressing in this context. First, contra
standard critiques, the patient is far from ‘passive’ in Parsons’ view. Accept-
ance of treatment itself, he insists, is one type of active participation of the
sick person. The less acute the immediate situation, moreover, ‘the more
likely it is that this participation will be substantial’, extending into ‘func-
tionally different areas’, including active participation in research
programmes (1975: 270). The second point meshes closely with the first,
namely that lay people, Parsons is happy to acknowledge, as a consequence
of their education and experience, ‘have a certain amount of knowledge
and understanding in matters of health and illness’ (1975: 271). Again this
proves a corrective, of sorts, to misplaced criticism that it is only doctors,
in Parsons’ view, who have any real know-how when it comes to matters
of health and illness. The notion of technical expertise and specialized
training, none the less, he suggests, provides an important reminder, if not
warning, of the limits of any such lay knowledge and understanding. Lay
judgements in these matters, indeed, Parsons boldly proclaims, are ‘notori-
ously fallible’ (1975: 271).
This returns us, once again, to Parsons’ underlying conviction that the
‘professional–lay relationship in the field of illness and health care cannot
be treated as a fully symmetrical relationship in the hierarchical dimen-
sion’. With respect to the ‘inherent functions of effective care and the
amelioration of conditions of illness’, that is to say, ‘there must be a
built-in insitutionalized superiority of the professional roles, grounded in
responsibility, competence and occupational concern’ (1975: 271). This,
Parsons hastens to add, is not for a moment to say that ‘the exact ways
in which the lines should be drawn can be neatly deduced from such
general considerations’. These matters, instead, are ‘inherently extremely
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complex, and the situation is far from being static’. Hence, it is entirely
reasonable to suppose that ‘the lines should be shifted from time to time
in the light of new knowledge and changing conditions’ (1975: 272).
Despite this, Parsons ‘fails to see’ how it is ‘possible to eliminate the
element of inequality’ at the heart of the doctor–patient relationship
(1975: 272).
Translated into contemporary debates on medical practice in particular
and health care in general, two key issues arise here. The first concerns
recent (policy) debates on the advent of so-called ‘lay experts’ and ‘expert
patients’. We see this, for example, very clearly in current sociological
debates as to just how ‘lay’ lay beliefs are in fact (Shaw, 2002), the shift
from notions of lay ‘beliefs’ to lay ‘knowledge’ (Good, 1994; Bury, 1997)
and in recent Government initiatives such as The expert patient: A new
approach to chronic disease management for the 21st century, published by
the Department of Health in September 2001 – a key element of which was
to introduce self-management training programmes (developed in the
United States) for patients. Expert patients, this document boldly
proclaims, ‘feel confident’ and ‘in control’ of their lives; aim to manage
their condition and its treatment ‘in partnership’ with health care
professionals; ‘communicate effectively’ with professionals and are ‘willing
to share responsibility and treatment’; are ‘realistic about the impact of
their disease’ on themselves and their families; and finally ‘use their skills
and knowledge to lead full lives’.
There is, to be sure, much to criticize as well as commend in such docu-
ments and policy statements, not least as far as Government rhetoric and
individual responsibility are concerned. A return to Parsons indeed
provides a further note of caution here, not simply in terms of the limits to
consumerism identified earlier, but more specifically in terms of the limits
of lay people’s own technical competence and expertise in medical matters.
Yes, people may become experts of sorts, including participation in training
programmes of this very kind perhaps, but what we are really talking about
here, in the main, are experiential or embodied forms of knowledge, rather
than technical expertise. This knowledge, moreover, echoing Parsons, may
be ‘factually incorrect’, ‘wide of the mark’, ‘in error’, or ‘downright danger-
ous’, from a scientific or technical viewpoint at least. Prior (2003), it seems,
is of a similar opinion, with data to back it up from his own recent research
in this domain. Patients, he admits, ‘can have extensive knowledge of their
own lives and the conditions in which they live’. They can also, and some-
times have to, turn themselves into ‘experts in order to challenge medical
hegemony’. But, for the most part, he argues:
lay people are not experts. They are, for example, rarely skilled in matters of
(medical) fact gathering, or in the business of diagnosis. What is more they can
often be plain wrong about the causes, course and management of common
forms of disease and illness. (2003: 45)
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It is perhaps time to recognize then, Prior concludes:
the virtues of expertise, and not to confuse issues concerning the use and manipu-
lation of technical knowledge (the realm of expertise) with the worthy political
aim of ensuring participation and consultation of the lay public in all matters to
do with medicine. (2003: 54)
There are dangers here too, of course, of downplaying or devaluing these
other forms of (embodied, experiential) expertise, and of confusing or
conflating lay knowledge with lay beliefs. The general point, none the less,
holds good that there are problems as well as opportunities to any such
‘levelling of the playing field’ when it comes to matters of expertise.
The second key issue here concerns the fate of Parsonian ‘trust’ in
contemporary medical practice. Trust relations may well have changed
(since Parsons’ time) in conditions of late or postmodernity; a shift, in
Giddens’ (1991) terms, towards more ‘active’ forms of trust that have to be
continually won rather than assumed in the face of (radical) doubt. Yet
trust, active or otherwise, remains a vital ingredient of all social relations,
including our dealings with medicine and doctors. This indeed is very much
the assumption behind recent attempts, on the part of the British medical
profession, to (re)establish public trust through sound self-regulation which
should, it is argued, bring the public’s and the profession’s interests ‘success-
fully together’ (again). A ‘strengthened professionalism’, in other words,
demonstrating good standards of practice and effective mechanisms of self-
regulation and openness, is the proposed ‘remedy’ for medicine’s malaise:
the means of (re)securing public trust while safeguarding, at one and the
same time, the independence of the profession in the face of greater threats
of external control (see, for example, Irvine, 1997a, 1997b, 2001; GMC,
2002) – some things never change!
To this, of course, we may add the further paradox, if paradox it is, that
people’s alleged increasing disillusionment with medicine goes hand in
hand with our increasing dependence on it. Our trust or faith in medicine,
in short, may well be different now than it was in Parsons’ time, though
even this is debatable, but it has far from disappeared altogether, even in
these ‘uncertain’ times.
Uncertainty, magic and pseudo-science:
the limits of rationalization?
These discussions of authority, trust and expertise, in turn raise important
further questions as to the very nature and status of medical knowledge,
and its application in the clinical context. More specifically, in the face of
ongoing rationalization processes, if not the McDonaldization of medicine
and health care (Turner, 1992; Ritzer, 1995, 1997), it forces us to confront
inescapable elements of uncertainty, if not magic or pseudo-science, in
medical practice, both past and present.
Again Parsons’ analysis of medical practice provides a seminal contribution
health: 9(2)
136
01 Williams (bc/t)  25/2/05  2:59 pm  Page 136
to these debates; one actively taken up and pursued, as a lifelong project,
by Parsons’ protégé Renee Fox (whose work we shall return to shortly). It
has already been said that, for Parsons, there are many potential or inherent
sources of (emotional) strain, tension and frustration in medical practice,
which themselves acquire special significance because of the ‘magnitude’
and ‘character’ of the ‘interests at stake’ (Parsons, 1951: 449). The absolute
limits of the physician’s control, in this respect, are not the only source of
frustration and strain. Within these limits, Parsons notes, there is a very
important element of uncertainty. As in so many practical situations,
indeed, the exact nature of the ‘known’ to the ‘unknown’ elements bearing
on this situation cannot be determined: ‘The unknown may operate at any
time to invalidate expectations built upon analysis of the known . . .’ (1951:
449).
This, Parsons holds, is evident even if one confines one’s attention to the
‘physiological-biomedical levels of analysis of medical problems’ (1951:
449). The general effect of the existence of large factors of known impos-
sibility and of uncertainty, to repeat, imposes strain on the physician,
thereby making it more difficult for him (or her) to maintain a ‘purely
rational’ orientation to the job. Professional interactions with patients and
their intimates, moreover, add to these strains and underline these non-
rational if not irrational elements of medical practice. Non-rational or
irrational tendencies, in short, implicate both patients and physicians alike.
Parsons, however, goes further here, suggesting (courtesy of Malinowski
among others) that the functional equivalents of ‘magic’ are frequently found
in medical practice: pseudo-science, in his terms, including an ‘optimistic
bias’ on the part of doctors and patients alike, which tend to cluster in situ-
ations where there is considerable uncertainty and when there are strong
emotional interests in the success of action. ‘The health situation’, he states,
‘is a classic one of the combination of uncertainty and strong emotional
interests which produce as situation of strain and is very frequently a promi-
nent focus of magic’ (1951: 469). If, from a purely technical point of view
both the individual doctor and the general tradition of medical practice are
‘optimistically biased’, he concludes, ‘it ought to help, through a “ritual”
demonstration of the will to recover that there is a chance’ (1951: 469,
emphasis in original). This argument, of course, Parsons concedes, cannot
be pushed too far. The ‘functional needs of society’, instead, call for a
‘delicate balance in this as in many other fields’ (1951: 469).
Again, it is clear, these Parsonian insights speak as powerfully and force-
fully to the present (and indeed the future) as they do to the past: the doubts
and uncertainties of modernity, in other words, let alone late modernity or
postmodernity, have long since been recognized. Fox, for example, in her
recent revisiting of medical uncertainty, states that ‘as the grounding of
medicine shifts in multi-dimensional ways, long-standing sources and mani-
festations of uncertainty have been reactivated, accentuated or modified,
and new ones have been found’ (2002: 250). It is, therefore, with: ‘extensive
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uncertainty about its state of knowledge and accomplishments, its value
commitments and its future directions, and with a mixture of confidence
and insecurity, that modern medicine faces the twenty-first century’ (Fox,
2002: 250). Viewed from this perspective, the uncertainties both Parsons
and Fox diagnosed way back in the 1950s have themselves not simply
persisted but in many respects worsened or exacerbated in the context of
‘rapid scientific and technological, cognitive and ethical, conceptual and
empirical, methodological and procedural, social and cultural change’
(Fox, 2002: 250). The uncertainties surrounding evidence-based medicine
(Sackett et al., 1997) are particularly important to stress in this context; yet
another paradox of contemporary medical practice, if not the paradox of
paradoxes. Despite being hailed as a ‘new paradigm’ that helps dispel
precisely such uncertainties, evidence-based medicine has in fact ‘brought
to the surface fundamental epistemological uncertainty about the nature of
good clinical research, good clinical practice and the relationship between
them’ (Fox, 2002: 245). It oversimplifies, moreover, the complexity of the
clinical situation, thereby (falsely) claiming certainty where none in fact
exists (Fox, 2002: 245; see also Hunter, 1996).
Recourse to Parsonian insights, then, helps us mount a concerted or
critical attack not simply on health policies pertaining to the ‘expert patient’,
but also to the (un)certain epistemological foundations of evidence-based-
medicine.
Health: late/postmodern Parsons?
It will not have escaped the reader’s notice that until now I have said very
little about Parsons’ treatment of health, as opposed to illness. Parsons, to
be sure, like many medical sociologists, said more about the latter than the
former. He did not, moreover, explicitly formulate a health role in quite
the way he did the sick role. He did, none the less, have some important
things to say about health, particularly in the light of American values.
Again this is important to stress, given the upsurge of (sociological) interest
in health matters on the one hand, and the tendency to equate the Parson-
ian legacy (in the main) with the sick role on the other. This also returns
us, of course, full circle, to issues of the body.
Health, for Parsons, is defined as a:
state of optimum capacity of an individual for the effective performance of the
roles and tasks for which he has been socialized. It is thus defined with reference
to the individual’s participation in the social system. It is also defined as relative
to his ‘status’ in the society, i.e., to differentiated type of role and correspond-
ing task structure, e.g., by sex or age, and by level of education which he has
attained and the like. (1964: 274, emphases in original)
It is not therefore, to repeat, a question of commitment (to particular roles,
tasks, norms or values) here, but of capacity, which in turn is relative, includ-
ing qualitative ranges in the differentiation of capacities within various
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groups and at given levels of education (Parsons, 1964: 274). These issues,
in turn, are further clarified in and through Parsons’ deployment of the
biologist, Ernst Mayr’s, term ‘teleonymy’ – namely the ‘capacity of an
organism, or its propensity, to undertake successful goal-oriented courses
of behaviour’ (Parsons, 1978b: 68). Health, in other words, building on this
definition, is to be ‘tentatively’ (read elaborately) conceived as the:
teleonomic capacity of an individual living organism. The teleonomic capacity
that we wish to call health, is the capacity to maintain a favourable self-regulated
state that is a prerequisite of the effective performance of an indefinitely wide
range of functions both within the system and in relation to its environments . . .
Again let it be said that although we accept the focusing of the concept of health
at the organic level of the individual, we wish to extend its relevance, on the one
hand, into the physical environment and, on the other, into the action environ-
ment and the telic8 system, that is, the psychological and sociocultural environ-
ment. (1978b: 69, emphasis added; see also Parsons, 1978c)
There are at least two ways in which these Parsonian insights on health
may be taken up, interpreted and addressed in the present context: one
perhaps more postmodern than the other, but both none the less putting
(healthy) bodies at the heart of the debate.
Shilling (2002), for example, in a recent article, notes how Parsons’
analysis of the deep cultural values underpinning western society – rooted
as they are in Christian traditions and concerned with maximizing instru-
mental efficiency – remains highly pertinent to the consumption of health
in the contemporary era, not least the emergence of informed, body-
conscious people. Parsons’ writings, from this stance, are not simply a
contribution to current (fashionable) sociological analyses of ‘pro-active,
“vigilant” approaches towards the healthy body, and the growth of “infor-
mation rich” consumers of health’, but may actually be seen, in an import-
ance sense, as ‘anticipating them, as helping to explain their emergence,
and as qualifying their relevance to lay behaviour’ (Shilling, 2002: 622).
Frank (1991), however, goes further here through his own imaginative
(postmodern) reconstruction or resurrection of Parsons. The Parsonian
view of health, he ventures, is not so much something that resides ‘in’ the
body, as that which circulates or flows between bodies. As a communicative
medium of exchange, health is based on the teleonomic capacity of bodies
(described earlier) within an interactive system. Health, that is to say, viewed
in this light, provides a bridge between any one organic body and its
environment: a property of ‘neither the body nor the environment, but that
which exists between them’ (Frank, 1991: 207). To this, Frank suggests, we
may add the following:
From Michel Foucault, we add that health is a medium of imposed bodily disci-
pline. From Jean Baudrillard, we question whose teleonomy is involved; thus
the second modification is ‘teleonomy mediatized’. From Jurgen Habermas, we
understand that the nature of health as a medium is to be ‘non-discursive’.
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Finally, in Pierre Bourdieu we return to Parsons’ notion of circulation to suggest
health as ‘physical capital’ . . . These modifications are in no sense discrete from
one another, but, as Parsons would be the first to recognize, they interpenetrate.
(1991: 207)
Where then does this leave us? Both accounts, to be sure, have their
merits, though Shilling perhaps too readily writes off the sick role in favour
of the ‘information rich consumer of health’, while Frank perhaps decon-
structs or reconstructs Parsons in ways he may or may not have approved
of. Frank’s account, none the less, supplements Shilling’s in important new
ways, adding further important insights and instructive modifications en
route. Seen in this light, then, it is not so much a question of choosing
between these accounts, but of each highlighting the richness and complex-
ity, if not the ambiguities, of Parsons’ work on health and illness – which
itself, of course, evolved from Chapter X of The social system in 1951 to
Action theory and the human condition in 1978 – and of his abiding import-
ance in these late/postmodern times. Parsons, in short, may very well have
been more late or postmodern than many of his critics, or he himself
perhaps, realized or cared to admit, not simply in his musings on health,
but in all the ways highlighted and discussed throughout this article. At the
very least, returning to Shilling, Parsons’ work does indeed anticipate as
well as qualify many of these debates.
Conclusions
The conclusions of this article are easy to discern. The Parsonian legacy, I
have argued, in keeping with other (recent) sympathetic commentators, is
indeed a rich one that lives on, within and beyond the sociology of health
and illness. Parsons, of course, is open to criticism on a number of counts,
some more valid than others, but his work clearly repays a close re-reading,
not simply for past sociological insights into medical practice but for present
and future debates in the health (care) arena. His indebtedness to psycho-
analytic ideas and insights, likewise, rekindles a profitable dialogue and
debate on relations between psychoanalysis and sociology: a case of
appraisal rather than praise, to be sure, but no less important for that.
As far as current debates are concerned, Parsons, as we have seen, has
important things to say about the (sick/mortal) body in medical practice,
including (ontological) issues of human suffering, frailty and vulnerability,
life and death and related matters to do with intimacy and taboo, if not the
sacred and the profane. These insights, in turn, are buttressed through
some prescient insights into the emotional stresses and strains of the
doctor–patient relationship, and the psychodynamics of the medical
encounter. Despite his consensual assumptions, moreover, Parsons speaks
forcefully and compellingly to the asymmetrical nature of doctor–patient
relations, given the expertise of the former and the needs of the latter, and
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the importance of trust (active or otherwise) as the binding force for both
parties to the encounter. To this, I have added two further Parsonian
legacies; the first concerning his seminal insights into the inescapable uncer-
tainties of medical practice, and the functional equivalents of magic in such
contexts; the second regarding his embryonic musings on health.
The implications of these issues for current debates on consumerism in
health care, and related issues of lay ‘expertise’ or ‘expert patients’, are
also worth stressing. At the very least, recourse to Parsons demonstrates
the danger or limits of much consumerist rhetoric, given our dependence
on medicine at the physical, emotional and technical levels, and the uncon-
scious as well as conscious processes at work here in any such medical
encounters. Again, I hasten to add, this is not to deny or underplay the
active role of the patient, let alone the notion of lay knowledge or embodied
expertise, simply to qualify it in important ways. The same may be said of
other recent policy developments and initiatives such as evidence-based
medicine. More radically, perhaps, Parsonian insights into the inescapable
problems of uncertainty in medical practice call into question the very
wisdom or logic of these initiatives: the epistemological equivalent, one
might say, of pissing in the wind.
Whether one wishes to go further here, and turn Parsons into something
like a prophet of the late modern condition or (heaven forbid) a closet post-
modernist, particularly as far as his views on uncertainty and health are
concerned, is of course a moot point. Certainly, as we have seen, it is
possible to view or reconstruct Parsons in this light, legitimately or other-
wise. To the extent, however, that the present article rekindles interest in
Parsons and revives such debates, it will indeed have served its purpose. It
may, in this respect, be pertinent to conclude with that old adage, as true
today as ever it was: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose!
Notes
1. The question of whether or not we should be talking here of medical sociology
or a more autonomous sociology of health and illness is, of course, an important
one. To the extent that Parsons refers to the former, however, I will follow suit
in this particular article, broadening the terms of reference to the sociology of
health and illness as and when appropriate.
2. I am not, of course, condoning this persistent reference point to doctors as men
(i.e. the doc-daddy-default). For every such quoted reference, therefore, please
read [sic].
3. Parsons’ pattern variables may be seen as attempts to resolve a series of
fundamental dilemmas that face any actor or social system. To the extent, for
example, that I attain my status through training and role performance, that I
put collective values over pure self-interest, that I engage with others for
instrumental rather than emotional reasons, that I relate to them only for
specific restricted purposes and that I judge people according to general criteria
rather than those unique to a particular person, then I may be characterized in
terms of the following pattern variables: Achievement, Collectivity-orientation,
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Affective-neutrality, Specificity, Universalism. The reciprocal options are
Ascription, Self-orientation, Affectivity, Diffuseness and Particularism. See, for
example, Parsons (1951: 46–51, 58–67).
4. Sub-cultures of sickness, of course, from another perspective, stance or
viewpoint, may be ‘empowering’ for the sick.
5. The individual more generally, Parsons’ insists,
is a synthesized combination of a living organism and a ‘personality system’,
conceived and analysed at the level of ‘action’ . . . In older terminology he is
a combination of a ‘body’ and a ‘mind’ . . . In the process of evolution,
personalities should be regarded as emergent from the organic level, as are
cultural systems in a different, though related way. (1978a: 331–2, emphases
added)
6. For a more general discussion of the problems of this reason–emotion,
rational–irrational division or divide, see Williams (2001).
7. Projection involves the psychic process of putting something outside of oneself,
into someone else or something; introjection to the taking ‘in’ of something
outside oneself, making it part of oneself; while splitting involves the splitting of
the world into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (Craib, 1988: 146).
8. The term ‘telic’, Parsons explains in a footnote, while obviously related to
teleonomic, is used in the present context to refer to one primary aspect of the
human condition, namely that in which ‘the problem of culturally and
symbolically defined meanings of the human conditions and its various aspects
comes to a head’. There is an important sense, in this respect, in which ‘the telic
environment is cybernetically superordinate to the general system of action and,
by virtue of this fact, to the organic level of the organization of living systems as
well’ (1978b: 69).
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